On Aug. 25, CIA Director John Ratcliffe landed in Moscow for talks on the Ukraine war. It was a meeting meant to be noticed; he traveled on a U.S. Air Force Boeing C-17A Globemaster III, a heavy military transport plane, thus not being particularly subtle. These kinds of meetings have taken place before, most recently just before the Russian invasion of Ukraine. During that meeting, Washington warned Moscow not to invade, demonstrating that the attack was no surprise and that Russia would not be deterred.
The Aug. 25 meeting was surrounded by speculation that Russia intended to launch some sort of military action against Europe in the Baltics. In one way, this makes sense: The war in Ukraine has gone on for nearly five years, and Russia needs it to end. In another way, it makes little sense: Moscow has repeatedly failed to defeat or occupy Ukraine. Why would the Kremlin choose to triple down by expanding the war?
One explanation is that it believes Europe wants to avoid war at all costs, and by making a credible threat to take action elsewhere, Europe might choose to reduce or end its support of Ukraine. This assumes, of course, that the U.S., having avoided direct military involvement under two administrations, would not intervene. The issue is whether the threat is credible. Given Russia’s performance in Ukraine, it’s unclear whether Moscow would be willing to engage NATO and, by likely extension, the United States. It is possible that Russia thinks U.S. preoccupation in Iran would keep it from engaging in Europe, and that therefore Europe would choose to reduce aid to Ukraine to avoid war.
The problem with this theory is that the U.S. currently maintains about 80,000 troops in Europe, most as part of NATO. NATO’S senior commander is American. It maintains an armored battalion in Latvia, where Ratcliff landed before flying to Moscow – noteworthy because some U.S. forces rotate through the Baltics. More, Washington has about 10,000 troops stationed in Poland, which boasts a large and capable military that borders the Baltics. Therefore, a Russian action in the Baltics would almost immediately encounter U.S. forces. That would make it necessary for the U.S. to engage regardless of what’s happening in Iran.
In addition, NATO has conducted major exercises throughout August. On Aug. 3, it carried out a major armored infantry exercise that included U.S. troops, and on Aug. 8, it executed a major air exercise commanded by U.S. officers. These drills are useful in their own right, and they send an unambiguous signal to Russia.
On the other hand, Russia’s ally in Belarus carried out readiness exercises, while President Alexander Lukashenko visited his Russian counterpart, Vladimir Putin, on Aug. 29. Belarus is important for Russian operations to the west, as well as for any escalation in Poland. (Its location is more important than its army.)
The point is that while Russia has signaled its intent to perhaps expand its operations into Europe, NATO has also been signaling its readiness. If Russia moved west, it would encounter substantial resistance not only from European countries but likely also from the United States. (Germany, for example, is permanently deploying its 45th armored brigade to Lithuania, a decision made in 2023 in response to the invasion of Ukraine. It will be the first permanent deployment of an entire German brigade outside Germany, with some 5,000 personnel expected to be fully operational by the end of 2027.)
It’s possible that Moscow is not threatening ground operations. It could be threatening drone attacks and hybrid warfare – that is, covert operations such as sabotage and psychological warfare, including propaganda – to intimidate Europe and thus increase hostilities.
Obviously, the U.S. and Europe want to avoid direct war with Russia; the U.S. is focused on Iran, and Europe is said to have a general aversion to combat. At the same time, it is clear not only that both are capable of fighting but also that the U.S. would likely be engaged from the very beginning.
It would seem, therefore, that the risks of escalation to Russia, given its performance in Ukraine, would make this an unlikely event. Threatening Europe might carry fewer risks but is unlikely to force Europe to stop aiding Ukraine.
It would seem to make no sense. But there is another thing to consider: Rumors have surfaced that Putin is not being given accurate information on the situation in Ukraine, and that he is being led to believe his forces are doing much better than they are. If that’s true, why wouldn’t Putin be satisfied to defeat Ukraine without the risk of an expanded war?
Another less widely circulated rumor is that Russian intelligence, which has grown hostile to Putin, wants to end the war. I think that if this were true, the last thing Russian or U.S. intelligence would want is any indication that they were collaborating.
Trying to make sense of this is not easy or even possible. But the fact remains that the war is five years old, Russia has taken only a very small part of Ukraine, and Ukraine shows no signs of collapse. Bearing in mind that the rumors mentioned are just rumors and not facts, if Putin knows what is going on and is not under internal threat, then he knows the war must end, and that he can increase drone and missile launches, but that would not force Ukraine to surrender. What is left to do is to seem to threaten the Baltic states, and to convince the West that he is about to force them into a war they don’t want. This is purely speculative, but if Putin wants out of Ukraine – which he should at this point – the appearance of escalation gives him an advantage in future negotiations.
The value of this opinion is minimal, but the idea that he is being fed false information and believes it, or that he fears the intelligence services, is even more unlikely. The fog of war can be foggy indeed.
